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CORPORATIONS-DERIVATIVE Surrs-STocKHOLDER DEMAND AS CoNnmoN 
PRECEDENT-A derivative suit alleging directors' fraud was brought by 
a minority shareholder, but there was no allegation of a demand for 
relief having been made on the corporation's stockholders prior to 
bringing the suit. The plaintiff did allege, however, that it was useless 
and impossible for him to make demand on the stockholders because 
the complaint charged directors' fraud which was a void act beyond 
the power of the stockholders to ratify, and secondly because it would be 
highly unreasonable to require plaintiff to make a demand for relief on 
more than 100,000 stockholders of the corporation. Delaware Chancery 
Rule 23(b)1 requires that a plaintiff in order to bring a derivative suit must 
allege with particularity his efforts to obtain the relief sought from the 
directors of the corporation and "if necessary" from the stockholders, 
or his reasons for failing to make such demand. The lower court held that 
plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to excuse the condition precedent 
of stockholder demand established by the chancery rule, and dismissed the 
bill.2 On appeal, held, reversed, with petition for reargument denied. The 
Delaware chancery rule does not require a useless act and when directors' 
fraud, which is beyond the power of the stockholders to ratify, is alleged 
1 Court of Chancery Rules, rule 23(b), 13 Del. Code Ann. (1952) 122 provides: "The 
c.omplaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from 
the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the stockholders such action 
as he desires •.. or the reasons for not making such effort." 
2 Mayer v. Adams, (Del. Ch. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 138. Compare Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 
(Del. Ch. 1957) 134 A. (2d) 565, for a picture of the uncertainty in the Chancery Court 
c.oncerning the proper application of rule 23(b) prior to the decision in the principal case. 
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stockholder demand is not "necessary." Mayer v. Adams, (Del. 1958) 141 
A. (2d) 458. 
American courts are divided on the subject of stockholder demand as 
a condition precedent to the derivative suit. One group follows the so-
called English rule,8 which states that a prior demand on the stockholders 
is a condition precedent to bringing a derivative suit only when the acts 
complained of are ratifiable by the shareholders.4 The other view, the 
American or federal rule, was founded on the same theory as the English 
rule,5 but subsequent development has made it more stringent.6 The 
American rule now requires prior demand on the stockholders before 
bringing suit even though the acts complained of are not ratifiable,7 
but the courts in applying this rule have held that stockholder demand 
will be excused in certain circumstances where it would be "totally use-
less."8 The English rule appears to be the better view of the stockholder 
demand requirement since it is based on the sound principle that it is 
unnecessary to require demand if the stockholders cannot block the deriv-
ative suit.9 This is the case when a void act which the shareholders cannot 
ratify, such as fraud, is alleged. Prior to adoption of chancery rule 23(b) 
s An old English case, Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843), is the 
first case stating the rule of stockholder demand. Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 
206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912), 51 L.R.A. (n.s.) 112 (1914), is the leading American case 
applying the English rule. See also Fisher v. National Mortgage Loan Co., 132 Neb. 185, 
271 N.W. 433 (1937). 
4 As to what acts are ratifiable, see Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A. (2d) 
904 (1938); 6 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 269 (1939); 53 HARV. L. REv. 1368 (1940). 
5 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881), the leading case on the American rule of 
stockholder demand, cited and approved Foss v. Harbottle, note 3 supra. 
6 See Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 109 A. (2d) 277 (1954), for an 
excellent summary of this development. See also 72 A.L.R. 628 (1931). 
7 The primary justification which the courts give for requiring stockholder demand 
when the acts complained of are not ratifiable is that a majority of the stockholders 
may be able to rectify the wrong (i.e., by removing the directors, ordering an accounting 
or taking the suit over in their own right) even though they could not ratify it. See 
Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 -Mo. 185, 30 s.w. (2d) 976 (1930); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 
3528-3530 (1948). Experience, however, has shown that any such rectification is extremely 
unlikely to occur, particularly in larger corporations. See Carroll v. New York, New 
Haven & Hartford R. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 456, noted in 55 MICH. L. REv. 
450 (1957), for a striking example of the impossibility of stockholder rectification of 
corporate injuries. Only one state, Massachusetts, has gone beyond stockholder rectifica-
tion as the reason for requiring demand, to the extreme position that a majority of the 
stockholders could actually veto a derivative suit even though they do not have the 
power to ratify the acts complained of. See Stickells, "Derivative Suits-The Requirement 
of Demand Upon the Stockholders," 33 BOST. UNIV. L. REv. 435 (1953). 
s Hawes v. Oakland, note 5 supra. Stockholder demand under the American rule is 
generally held to be excused when a majority of the shareholders are involved in the 
acts complained of, or when there is insufficient time to make a demand on the stock-
holders because immediate injury to the corporation is threatened. See also Hill v. Wal-
lace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
9 See generally, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §146 (1946), for a discussion of the better 
approach to the stockholder demand requirement. 
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and this decision, the Delaware courts had not specifically ruled on the 
requirement of stockholder demand. The silence of the Delaware courts 
can be taken to mean that they either had no requirement of stockholder 
demand whatsoever,10 or that they followed the English rule.11 The 
problem presented in the principal case is that chancery rule 23(b) is a 
prototype of federal rule 23(b), which is commonly considered ;i. codifica-
tion of the American rule on stockholder demand.12 Thus it is arguable that 
the adoption of this provision carries with it adoption of the American 
rule. The Delaware court, however, wisely rejected this argument and 
interpreted the "necessary" proviso in rule 23(b) as requiring only cir-
cumstances similar to those required under the English rule. The court 
in reaching this decision points out that not even the federal courts are 
in complete harmony in applying the American rule,13 and that a state 
court is not bound to follow federal interpretation of a procedural rule 
when a conflict with substantive law would result.14 It is also pertinent 
for state courts to note that a federal court may be justified in interpreting 
the stockholder demand requirement more stringently than is necessary 
in a state forum because of a need to limit sham diversity jurisdiction 
through derivative suits.15 At least one state court, however, has felt that 
the adoption of rule 23 (b) has bound the court to accept the American 
rul~ despite the fact that this rule is contrary to its prior practice and 
natural inclination.16 The principal case, therefore, by indicating that 
enactment of the federal rule does not necessarily require adoption of 
the American rule on stockholder demand, establishes a valuable prece-
dent for state courts confronted with the problem of interpreting rule 23(b). 
The practical question whether a stockholder demand requirement 
10 The Delaware courts Ji.ad never explicitly defined their position on stockholder 
demand, but their silence and customary practice indicated that there was no demand 
requirement prior to the adoption of rule 23(b). See, generally, Sohland v. Baker, 15 
Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1927); Toebelmann v. Mo.-Kan. Pipeline Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 
41 F. Supp. 334. 
11 Steinberg v. Hardy, (D.C. Conn. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 167, interpreted the silence of 
the Delaware courts on stockholder demand as an acceptance of the English rule. 
12'Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, note 6 supra. 
13 Compare Bruce &: Co. v. Bothwell, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 45, and Steinberg v. 
Adams, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 604. 
14 The court pointed out that the adoption of the American rule would partially 
nullify the rule of substantive law in Delaware that the stockholders cannot ratify fraud. 
Keenan v. Eshleman, note 4 supra. 
15 Hawes v. Oakland, note 5 supra, points out the undesirable use of derivative suits 
as a means of sham diversity jurisdiction. This practice was one of the reasons for the 
development of the American rule on stockholder demand in the federal courts. 
16 Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, note 6 supra. The adoption of rule 23(b) in 
this state was by legislative enactment rather than by court rules. Therefore, the court 
felt that the legislative intent forced them to accept the American rule. This problem 
of legislative intent would weaken the authority of the principal case in states where 
me legislature has adopted the federal rules. 
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should apply to widely-held corporations was not decided, however, by the 
instant case. In the setting of corporations with large numbers of stock-
holders, submission of a demand to the stockholders would be as expensive 
as a proxy fight, which the average plaintiff in a derivative suit can hardly 
afford.17 Yet there is only very meager authority which excuses stockholder 
demand because of the prohibitive cost involved in circulating the demand 
among thousands of shareholders.18 On the other hand there is considerable 
authority which, applying the American rule rather strictly, holds that 
the size of the corporate body and the expense to be incurred are not 
excuses for failing to make the demand.19 In jurisdictions where this re-
mains an open question, courts which do not wish to bar legitimate deriv-
ative suits in widely-held corporations should treat the prohibitive cost 
of a stockholder demand as an additional limitation on the requirement, 
whether they have adopted the English or American rule. The court in 
the principal case uses language which indicates that it might consider 
prohibitive cost a valid additional limitation on stockholder demand.20 
I£ such a suggestion is followed in later decisions the instant case will have 
made two significant contributions in determining proper application of 
the stockholder demand requirement. 
W. Stanley Walch, S.Ed. 
17 See Pomerantz v. Clark, (D.C. Mass. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 341, for an excellent ex-
ample of the expense involved in making a demand on the stockholders of a widely-held 
corporation. 
18 Berg v. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington R. Co., (E.D. Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 842. 
19 Bruce & Co. v. Bothwell, note 13 supra; Pomerantz v. Clark, note 17 supra; Carroll 
v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., note 7 supra. 
20 Principal case at 461. 
